Feb 13, 2026 | | This post is also available in: Arabic
Introduction
As Syria rebuilds and rewrites its social contract, Syrians from different viewpoints and positions engage in active discussion about their vision for the country. One paradigmatic site of contestation is the discussion around how to best address the myriad of economic crimes rampant in Syria’s recent history. Layered discussions between different stakeholders and rights-holders, as well as across different themes and topics, demonstrate the contours of this contestation.
These conversations also reveal potential pathways for victim participation for shaping and guiding transitional justice and norm-building in Syria. The Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP) endeavors to ally itself with victim groups and local civil society organizations eager to engage in this critical moment. Through its reports, investigations, and capacity-building trainings, SLDP aims to promote deeper and outcome-oriented discourse between affected communities and decision makers.
The extent and nature of economic crimes throughout the conflict and under the Assad regime, including profiteering, corruption, and business-related human rights violations, is well documented. At this juncture, however, Syrians must confront how exactly to deal with that past, enact institutional change, and ensure non-recurrence. Additionally, victims and affected communities face the reality of dealing with the residual or ongoing harm while also advocating for their rights to remedy.
Layered Conversations Among Stakeholders
On January 17, 2026, the Salameh Kaileh Cultural Forum hosted a panel discussion titled “Transitional Justice…the Economy as an Arena of Violations.” Structured initially as a moderated conversation among three panelists, the event later transformed into a discussion with audience participation. This brought out multiple, overlapping layers of dialogue that together revealed how unresolved and actively negotiated the question of economic crimes remains within Syria’s transitional justice landscape. Participants represented a broad cross-section of Syrian society, including members of communities impacted by economic crimes, civil society activists and experts, academics, journalists, and representatives of the National Transitional Justice Committee (NTJC). The diversity of voices underscored both the centrality of economic crimes to Syrians’ lived experiences and the lack of consensus on how such crimes should be addressed moving forward.
One layer of dialogue emerged between civil society actors and experts on one hand and representatives of the NTJC on the other. Members of the NTJC in attendance posed questions to the panelists regarding what an “ideal” approach to economic justice and economic violations might look like within a transitional justice framework. The NTJC interventions signaled both a willingness to listen and an ongoing grappling with the conceptual and legal complexity of economic crimes, including questions of criminal liability, attribution of responsibility, and appropriate forms of redress. Notably, the panelists did not offer definitive answers or clear standards for determining which behaviors should trigger accountability or how reparations ought to be structured. Instead, the exchange highlighted the extent to which key issues – such as identifying perpetrators, categorizing violations, and selecting suitable accountability mechanisms – remain open, contested, and in need of further elaboration.
The event also demonstrated a second layer of ongoing debate. More specifically, this debate between different entities within the Syrian government manifested in references to the reconciliation agreement between Mohammad Hamsho, one of the former government’s major financiers and businessman with a record of profiteering, and the National Commission for Combating Illicit Gain.
This event took place shortly after the announcement of this agreement; participants explicitly referenced the agreement and subsequent clarifications by the NTJC that such settlements do not preclude prosecution or accountability for international crimes or for financing them. This reflected an implicit recognition that economic justice is being negotiated not only between state and society, but also within state institutions, as different bodies assert overlapping or competing mandates. The treatment of well-known and well-documented economic violators thus emerged as a focal point for broader anxieties about selective accountability and the boundaries of compromise during transition.
Finally, the discussion surfaced a broader conversation among different segments of Syrian citizenry, shaped by regional and socioeconomic divides. One speaker questioned why public debate and transitional justice attention appeared disproportionately focused on Damascus given the widespread nature of economic crimes across the country. This intervention opened space for reflecting on how geography, class, and visibility influence whose harms are centered and whose experiences risk marginalization. Ultimately, this audience member’s pushback uncovered an apparent willingness of all attendees to engage in the future with more nuance and breadth about how economic crimes and violations impact Syrians beyond Damascus and across socioeconomic differences.
Taken together, these layered conversations illustrate that economic crimes occupy a deeply contested space within Syria’s transitional moment. Rather than converging on a single narrative or solution, stakeholders are actively negotiating meanings, priorities, and boundaries of justice.
Role of the Syrian Legal Development Programme
It is often in such contested arenas that empowered actors can influence outcomes. It is important that victims, affected communities, and other rights-holders play a leading role in influencing the transitional justice system’s approach to economic crimes.
The Syrian Legal Development Programme plays a deliberately facilitative role – anchored in the question of where, and how, the most victim-centered change can realistically be advanced during a period of institutional flux. In moments of heightened contestation, organizations such as SLDP are positioned to bridge gaps between victims, civil society experts, and emerging state institutions by strengthening the conditions for informed and empowered engagement. While affected communities continue to navigate the material, psychological, and emotional demands of rebuilding their lives, SLDP is able to devote sustained attention to monitoring legal developments, unpacking the legal implications of policy decisions, and tracking evolving transitional justice mechanisms.
This specialized engagement enables SLDP, and other similarly situated NGOs, to translate complex legal and institutional processes into accessible knowledge that can be shared with victims and grassroots actors, thereby supporting their ability to exercise their agency and advocate for the outcomes they seek. In particular, the emerging dialogue between civil society, impacted communities, and bodies such as the NTJC represents a promising site for advancing victim-centered approaches to economic crimes. Particularly given the above discussed fact that the NTJC is directly asking Syrian citizens to provide their answers to complicated questions about justice for economic crimes and violations. When community members are empowered to answer such questions, informed on the latest developments, and knowledgeable about international legal standards and comparative contexts, Syria and Syrians benefit from fuller, more representative justice frameworks.
Syria’s transitional period can be viewed as a moment of country-wide negotiations. For those negotiations to result in the best possible outcome for affected communities and victims, victims need to be at the table, empowered to advocate for the realities, decisions, and processes they envision.
Written by: Sumaya Daghestani, Legal Intern at the Human Rights & Business Unit, J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School.