Author: sldp admin

In northeastern Syria, oil burners, primitive machines used to refine extracted oil and separate its derivatives, were transformed during the years of war from an emergency solution for securing fuel into a parallel economy that produces chronic pollution, health risks, and workplace accidents, while at the same time sustaining a broad livelihood network for families with no other options. 

On 8 February 2026, the Syrian Minister of Energy announced the permanent closure of oil burners in Deir ez-Zur governorate, on the grounds that they constitute an unlawful activity outside legal frameworks and cause serious environmental and health harm, while promising to study professional alternatives for workers and to provide fuel derivatives through formal channels.

The Emergence of Oil Burners in the War Economy

Oil burners did not emerge as an economic choice so much as a direct response to the state’s absence from the energy sector. Formal refineries declined or ceased operating, and control over oil fields was divided among multiple actors, including the al Omar oil field, where burners appeared on its outskirts. At the same time, electricity and heating networks collapsed, and fuel became a scarce commodity that was difficult to access. In this context, oil burners spread near wells and along roads, producing low quality fuel that was cheaper than formal fuel derivatives when those were available, which in practice made it the fuel of the poor in many villages and towns.

But this expansion did not come without cost. The operation of oil burners was tied to a mode of production that was extremely dangerous to both the environment and public health, because of toxic emissions and the absence of even the minimum safety standards, with harmful effects extending to soil and agriculture, to water used for drinking and irrigation, and to workers exposed to burns, explosions, and prolonged contact with toxic fumes. This danger was compounded by their spread near populated areas, and by the fact that large numbers of residents came to depend on them as a direct or indirect source of income.

The Syrian Ministry of Energy’s Decision: Environmental and Sovereign Drivers in Regulatory Language

The official decision brought together two dimensions. The first was environmental and health related, presenting oil burners as a continuous source of pollution and risk to residents. The second was sovereign and regulatory, linking their closure to restoring order to the oil sector under a unified official administration. In this sense, the decision was not framed merely as a technical measure concerning public safety, but also as a step to remove primitive refining from an unregulated margin and bring it back into a framework controlled by the state and its institutions.

It is difficult to separate this direction from the broader shift that the energy sector witnessed at the beginning of 2026, with the Syrian authorities regaining control over a number of oil fields and facilities in the east and north east, and beginning official visits, assessments, and rehabilitation operations at the recovered sites. The decision to close the burners therefore appears to be part of a broader process aimed at restoring control over natural resources and redefining who holds the right to production, refining, and distribution within the Syrian oil sector.

Local Reactions and the Burning of Some Oil Burners

The local reaction revealed the central contradiction. People understand the harm, but they fear the vacuum that closure leaves behind. Several areas witnessed protests, road blockages, and the burning of tires in rejection of the suspension of an activity that had for years become both a source of income and an alternative source of fuel.

Economically, local testimonies documented rapid increases in fuel prices after implementation began, which placed pressure on heating and transport and raised the cost of goods. In some areas, this coincided with the lifting of subsidies for generator fuel, and because many communities already relied on private generators in the absence of reliable state electricity, the environmental decision quickly spilled over into people’s access to electricity and other basic services. In western rural Deir ez-Zur, residents of al Jalamidah intercepted oil tankers and prevented them from leaving, in protest over fuel shortages and the loss of livelihoods.

The most dangerous aspect was the path of security enforcement. Press reports spoke of raids and the burning or destruction of some burners in eastern rural Deir ez-Zur, including sites in Dhiban, al Tayyana, and al Jurthi, after operators refused to shut them down. Reports also referred to the destruction or detonation of burners in the desert area of Jadid Bakara. The irony is that dismantling them by force may reduce polluting activity in the long term, but it also turns pollution into a toxic peak and increases the risks of leakage and explosion.

Balancing the Right to a Healthy Environment and the Right to Work and a Decent Living

From a human rights perspective, the decision to close primitive oil burners cannot be viewed as a purely environmental measure, because it sits at the intersection of several fundamental rights. On the one hand, combating pollution and protecting residents from toxic emissions is consistent with the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. On the other hand, thousands of families in the region became materially dependent on this activity during the years of war, which means that its sudden closure, without clear alternatives, does not only affect sources of income, but also threatens the right to work and the right to an adequate standard of living.

The problem, then, is not the principle of closure itself, but the way it was implemented. When an environmental policy is imposed without prior consultation with the affected communities, without clear information about alternatives, and without compensation, training, or social protection for workers, it ceases to be a reform measure and becomes a new social burden. It also affects other rights that are no less important, such as the right to participation, access to information, and fairness in bearing the cost of transition. This is why the idea of a just transition emerges as the clearest framework for addressing this dilemma, namely, managing environmental transformation in a way that reduces harm, protects workers, expands social protection, and relies on dialogue with affected groups, so that environmental protection does not become a pretext for producing more poverty and marginalization.

What Must Be Done: A Comprehensive Government Approach That Takes the Environment, Human Rights, and Living Conditions into Account

What is needed is a shift from enforcement to governance. This means, first, a phased timetable for closure, together with the registration of workers and facilities and an assessment of risks, and the dismantling of burners in a safe manner that prevents their sudden burning, reduces leakage, and begins remediation of contaminated soil and water where necessary.

Second, immediate fuel alternatives must be secured in quantities sufficient for heating, electricity, and transport through formal channels and at affordable prices, together with a transparent and temporary subsidy policy during the winter months, so that an environmental decision does not become a crisis of services and livelihoods.

Third, there must be a just transition program for workers and investors that includes employment opportunities in formal supply chains, pollution removal and land rehabilitation work, and energy infrastructure projects, together with short-term vocational training. Most importantly, the alternative must be announced at the same time as the ban, not after it, and through grievance mechanisms and clear standards that protect workers’ rights and reduce investors’ losses as much as possible within the rule of law.

Ultimately, the closure decision, despite its environmental and health justifications, should not become a sentence of economic destruction against a broad segment of society. What is needed is a comprehensive vision that links environmental justice with social justice, and that balances the state’s duty to protect resources and public health with its duty to secure dignified livelihoods. Only through such an approach can sustainable development be achieved in Deir ez-Zur and the Jazira region in a way that benefits both people and the environment together.

Written by: Alaa Younes, Researcher, Human Rights & Business Unit

After decades of authoritarian rule under the Assad regime, Syria faces the immense task of rebuilding institutions weakened by systemic corruption, opaque governance, and widespread economic crimes. For many Syrians, the transition now underway represents more than a political turning point—it is an opportunity to build public institutions that are transparent, accountable, and responsive to citizens. Rooting out corruption, and preventing it from taking root in new public and private structures, is therefore high on the agenda for civil society and policymakers alike.

Corruption is not merely a governance failure; it is fundamentally a human rights issue. When public resources are siphoned away through bribery, embezzlement, or crony contracting, the consequences are felt most acutely in everyday life. Funds intended for schools, hospitals, infrastructure, and social services are diverted, weakening the state’s ability to fulfil economic and social rights. Marginalized communities are often the most affected, as corruption dictates access to public services and opportunities. Corruption in Syria also fuelled violence, financing armed networks and reinforcing the economic structures that sustained instability.

As Syria begins the long process of reconstruction and institutional reform, one tool increasingly discussed for addressing corruption and rebuilding trust is digital governance—the digitisation and digitalisation of government records, processes, and services. If implemented carefully, digital systems could help increase transparency, enable citizen oversight, and strengthen accountability across public institutions. These processes also, however, carry risks if introduced without proper safeguards, legal frameworks, and inclusive design.

From Digitisation to Digitalisation
Digital governance is often discussed as a single concept, but it involves two distinct processes.

Digitisation refers to converting physical information into digital formats—for example, scanning paper records, creating electronic databases, or digitising archives. Digitising land registries or procurement contracts, for instance, reduces the risk that documents will be lost, altered, or destroyed. It also allows records to be more easily searched and reviewed, enabling oversight bodies to identify patterns of corruption.

Yet digitisation alone does not necessarily transform governance. If the same officials retain control over access to the database, the underlying dynamics of discretion and opacity may remain unchanged.

Digitalisation, by contrast, refers to the use of digital technologies to fundamentally change how institutions operate and deliver services. Digitalisation can reduce opportunities for corruption by automating processes, increasing traceability, and opening government data to public scrutiny.

In short, while digitisation strengthens evidence and record-keeping, digitalisation can reshape power structures within public administration. In Syria, both processes will be necessary, but their impact will depend on how they are designed and implemented.

Transparency in Public Procurement
Public procurement is historically one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption, particularly in post-conflict environments where large reconstruction contracts are awarded. Digitisation could begin by scanning past procurement contracts and creating searchable databases of tender documents and awarded projects. This would preserve records for future audits and make it more difficult for officials to conceal inflated contracts or missing funds.

Digitalisation could go further. An electronic procurement platform could publish tender announcements, bidder lists, evaluation criteria, contract values, and award decisions online. Real-time contract monitoring systems could track the implementation of reconstruction projects, while open data portals could allow civil society organisations to analyse procurement patterns.

Such transparency makes it significantly harder for corrupt networks to manipulate contracting processes or conceal conflicts of interest.

Tracking Public Finances
Digital tools could also strengthen transparency in public financial management. Digitising ministry budgets, payment vouchers, and payroll records would help create reliable digital archives and enable review of government spending.

Digitalisation could then expand public oversight. Governments can publish monthly expenditure reports, transfers to municipalities, and reconstruction fund disbursements through online platforms using machine-readable data. This would allow civil society, researchers, and future watchdog organizations to track how public funds are used and identify suspicious patterns such as ghost projects or unexplained spending gaps.

In a country where international reconstruction funds will likely play a major role, transparent financial systems will be critical to maintaining public trust and donor confidence.

The Risks of a Digital Transition
Despite these potential benefits, digital governance is not a panacea. Introducing digital systems without addressing underlying governance structures risks simply transferring corruption into new technological forms.

One of the most immediate challenges is the digital divide. Not all Syrians have reliable internet access or the digital literacy needed to use online services. Without inclusive design and continued offline alternatives, digital systems could exclude rural populations, older citizens, and marginalized groups from accessing essential services or participating in decision-making.

Cybersecurity and data protection also present major concerns. Government databases often contain sensitive personal information, such as identity records, financial data, or health information, making them attractive targets for cyberattacks. Weak security frameworks could expose citizens to misuse of their personal data.

Perhaps most importantly, digital systems themselves can become tools of control if implemented without rights-based safeguards. Syria’s past experience with digital repression illustrates this risk. Under the Assad regime, digital laws were frequently used to monitor citizens, censor dissent, and exploit personal data. Without strong legal protections for privacy, freedom of expression, and data protection, new digital tools could potentially be weaponised for surveillance rather than empowerment.

Building a Rights-Based Digital Future
For digital governance to support Syria’s democratic transition, it must be embedded within broader institutional reform. Technology alone cannot eliminate corruption; it must be combined with independent oversight institutions, transparent legal frameworks, and meaningful civic participation.

A phased approach may be necessary. Early efforts could focus on digitising critical archives, such as land records and procurement contracts, to preserve evidence and prevent manipulation. Later reforms could introduce digital procurement platforms, public financial transparency portals, and open data systems that enable citizens to monitor government activity.

Equally important is ensuring that digital systems are citizen-centred. User-friendly interfaces and digital literacy programmes can help ensure that all Syrians—not only the digitally connected—can access government services and participate in governance.

International cooperation will also play a role. Partnerships with technology experts, international organisations, and civil society groups can help develop secure digital infrastructure, share best practices, and strengthen capacity within Syrian institutions.

Technology as a Tool for Accountability
As Syria turns a page in its history, rebuilding trust between citizens and the state will be one of the greatest challenges ahead. Transparent institutions, accountable governance, and meaningful public participation are essential foundations for a stable and rights-respecting future.

In the fight against corruption, digital governance offers an opportunity to build a public administration that is more transparent, more accountable, and better equipped to serve the Syrian people.

Written by: Alreem Kamal, Legal Officer, Human Rights & Business Unit

Displacement and Suspended Property Rights

When the Marota (and Basilia) City project was announced in Damascus in 2012, it was presented as the jewel of a new capital: glass towers, luxury apartments, shopping centres, and wide boulevards promising the birth of a “modern” city. The Damascus Governorate promoted it as a flagship reconstruction project, and some portrayed it as a model that could be replicated across other Syrian cities.

But for the tens of thousands of Syrians who had lived in the Basateen al-Razi neighbourhood, where Marota’s foundations were first laid, and the larger number affected by the larger Basilia City, the project was a symbol of displacement and exclusion. Their homes were demolished, their property rights converted into opaque and unfairly priced shares, and they were promised “alternative housing” that has been long delayed.

The area covers approximately 2.2 square kilometres and is home to around 50,000 residents. At the time, the authorities promised to build 12,000 housing units to accommodate 60,000 people. Yet most of the original families were excluded from the outset. Before 2011, nearly half of Syria’s land was not formally zoned, meaning thousands of families relied on customary or inheritance documents that lost their value before opaque government valuation committees. Many received shares that did not reflect the true worth of their properties; others lost everything because they lacked official documentation or because their papers were lost during displacement.

Promises of alternative housing were not fulfilled. The law stipulates that replacement homes must be delivered within four years of eviction, but more than a decade has passed and many residents are still waiting. Some received meagre rental compensation that did not exceed 500,000 Syrian pounds annually, about $137, an amount insufficient for dignified living. This forced many to sell their shares to afford rent away from their land and neighbourhoods. These conditions were combined with loss of income for many who made a living from a shop or piece of land they owned.

The situation was worsened by the fact that refugees and the internally displaced were often unable to claim their rights at all. The laws required personal attendance or official documents that were frequently lost or impossible to obtain. For millions of Syrians abroad, or those fearing security repercussions, the path was effectively blocked from the start, especially for those who needed “security clearance” from the Assad regime’s Intelligence Services. There are also claims that some of the shareholders, who were detained by the Assad regime’s brutal machine, were forced to sign documents selling their shares in the project.

Key Timeline: Marota City & Syria’s Reconstruction

War Economy and Law No. 10

At the same time, the project became a golden opportunity for companies linked to influential businessmen, many of whom were linked to the Assad regime. International sanctions were imposed against these businesses and the government-owned Damascus Cham Holding for their participation in displacing these communities. This unprecedented business partnership between state-owned companies and private sector actors turned reconstruction into a mechanism for entrenching the war economy, and a tool to displace dissenting communities.

More troubling still, the model did not stop in Damascus. In 2018, Law No. 10 expanded the framework of Decree 66 to cover any area in Syria. This gave governors the authority to rebuild the widely destroyed opposition affiliated neighborhoods in collaboration with the private sector, in a fashion similar to Marota’s. Temporary displacement thus risked becoming permanent dispossession under the banner of “urban planning.”

Post-Assad: Balanced Redress Instead of Injustice Normalisation

The fall of the Assad regime more than a year ago offered a rare and long-awaited opportunity to rectify the injustices embedded in Marota City. A meaningful transitional process should revisit the legal foundations of Decree 66 and Law No. 10, reassess property valuations and opaque share allocations that failed to reflect genuine ownership, and establish independent restitution and compensation mechanisms to address wrongful dispossession, with victims’ participation. It created political space to shift reconstruction away from the logic of regime consolidation and toward a framework grounded in rights, transparency, participation and accountability.

However, protests have continued around the Marota City project. Affected communities argue that while the political leadership has changed, the policies governing the project have not fundamentally shifted. Many former residents are still waiting for a fair reassessment of their property rights, clearer and more accessible compensation mechanisms, or even a realistic path to return to their lands. Civil society warns that without independent review, judicial oversight, and meaningful community participation, the injustices entrenched under the previous framework risk becoming permanent under a new administration, thus consolidating violations of housing, land, and property (HLP) rights as well as crimes of pillage and forced displacement under international law.

Any reform of the Marota City project must also take into account the rights of those who have invested, bought, or sold property in good faith since 2012. Over more than a decade, secondary markets have developed, contracts have been signed, loans secured, and assets transferred under the existing legal framework. A resolution that ignores these transactions risks creating new layers of uncertainty and injustice. The objective should not be to replace one form of dispossession with another, but to design solutions that balance restitution for original owners with legal certainty for bona fide purchasers and investors. Transitional authorities must therefore ensure that any review mechanism distinguishes between profiteering linked to coercion or conflict, and legitimate transactions conducted lawfully and transparently. Protecting acquired rights alongside restoring dispossessed ones will be essential to rebuilding trust in both the property system and the broader rule of law.

Despite all this, Marota City continues to be presented by some as a showcase of modern reconstruction. In reality, it stands as a cautionary tale. Reconstruction that uproots communities, sidelines original residents, and converts homes into paper shares is not genuine renewal, it is the reproduction of injustice in a different form. Syria’s recovery cannot be built on confiscation, exclusion, or the erasure of grievance, but must rest on restoring rights, ensuring fair compensation, enabling safe return, and guaranteeing meaningful participation for displaced communities. Urban planning must be conducted with communities, not imposed upon them. Cities may be constructed with concrete and glass, but durable peace can only be built on justice.

How We Can Help

The challenges outlined in this article, from property restitution to corporate accountability and community participation, require not only political will but also technical expertise. We provide Business and Human Rights (BHR) consultation services to support think tanks, policymakers, and officials navigating these complex issues in Syria. Our expertise is built on experience in international law and rooted in engagement with affected communities.

Get in touch: info@sldp.ngo / visit: https://sldp.ngo/en/what-we-do

Introduction
As Syria rebuilds and rewrites its social contract, Syrians from different viewpoints and positions engage in active discussion about their vision for the country. One paradigmatic site of contestation is the discussion around how to best address the myriad of economic crimes rampant in Syria’s recent history. Layered discussions between different stakeholders and rights-holders, as well as across different themes and topics, demonstrate the contours of this contestation.

These conversations also reveal potential pathways for victim participation for shaping and guiding transitional justice and norm-building in Syria. The Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP) endeavors to ally itself with victim groups and local civil society organizations eager to engage in this critical moment. Through its reports, investigations, and capacity-building trainings, SLDP aims to promote deeper and outcome-oriented discourse between affected communities and decision makers.

The extent and nature of economic crimes throughout the conflict and under the Assad regime, including profiteering, corruption, and business-related human rights violations, is well documented. At this juncture, however, Syrians must confront how exactly to deal with that past, enact institutional change, and ensure non-recurrence. Additionally, victims and affected communities face the reality of dealing with the residual or ongoing harm while also advocating for their rights to remedy.

Layered Conversations Among Stakeholders
On January 17, 2026, the Salameh Kaileh Cultural Forum hosted a panel discussion titled “Transitional Justice…the Economy as an Arena of Violations.” Structured initially as a moderated conversation among three panelists, the event later transformed into a discussion with audience participation. This brought out multiple, overlapping layers of dialogue that together revealed how unresolved and actively negotiated the question of economic crimes remains within Syria’s transitional justice landscape. Participants represented a broad cross-section of Syrian society, including members of communities impacted by economic crimes, civil society activists and experts, academics, journalists, and representatives of the National Transitional Justice Committee (NTJC). The diversity of voices underscored both the centrality of economic crimes to Syrians’ lived experiences and the lack of consensus on how such crimes should be addressed moving forward.

One layer of dialogue emerged between civil society actors and experts on one hand and representatives of the NTJC on the other. Members of the NTJC in attendance posed questions to the panelists regarding what an “ideal” approach to economic justice and economic violations might look like within a transitional justice framework. The NTJC interventions signaled both a willingness to listen and an ongoing grappling with the conceptual and legal complexity of economic crimes, including questions of criminal liability, attribution of responsibility, and appropriate forms of redress. Notably, the panelists did not offer definitive answers or clear standards for determining which behaviors should trigger accountability or how reparations ought to be structured. Instead, the exchange highlighted the extent to which key issues – such as identifying perpetrators, categorizing violations, and selecting suitable accountability mechanisms – remain open, contested, and in need of further elaboration.
The event also demonstrated a second layer of ongoing debate. More specifically, this debate between different entities within the Syrian government manifested in references to the reconciliation agreement between Mohammad Hamsho, one of the former government’s major financiers and businessman with a record of profiteering, and the National Commission for Combating Illicit Gain.

This event took place shortly after the announcement of this agreement; participants explicitly referenced the agreement and subsequent clarifications by the NTJC that such settlements do not preclude prosecution or accountability for international crimes or for financing them. This reflected an implicit recognition that economic justice is being negotiated not only between state and society, but also within state institutions, as different bodies assert overlapping or competing mandates. The treatment of well-known and well-documented economic violators thus emerged as a focal point for broader anxieties about selective accountability and the boundaries of compromise during transition.

Finally, the discussion surfaced a broader conversation among different segments of Syrian citizenry, shaped by regional and socioeconomic divides. One speaker questioned why public debate and transitional justice attention appeared disproportionately focused on Damascus given the widespread nature of economic crimes across the country. This intervention opened space for reflecting on how geography, class, and visibility influence whose harms are centered and whose experiences risk marginalization. Ultimately, this audience member’s pushback uncovered an apparent willingness of all attendees to engage in the future with more nuance and breadth about how economic crimes and violations impact Syrians beyond Damascus and across socioeconomic differences.
Taken together, these layered conversations illustrate that economic crimes occupy a deeply contested space within Syria’s transitional moment. Rather than converging on a single narrative or solution, stakeholders are actively negotiating meanings, priorities, and boundaries of justice.

Role of the Syrian Legal Development Programme

It is often in such contested arenas that empowered actors can influence outcomes. It is important that victims, affected communities, and other rights-holders play a leading role in influencing the transitional justice system’s approach to economic crimes.

The Syrian Legal Development Programme plays a deliberately facilitative role – anchored in the question of where, and how, the most victim-centered change can realistically be advanced during a period of institutional flux. In moments of heightened contestation, organizations such as SLDP are positioned to bridge gaps between victims, civil society experts, and emerging state institutions by strengthening the conditions for informed and empowered engagement. While affected communities continue to navigate the material, psychological, and emotional demands of rebuilding their lives, SLDP is able to devote sustained attention to monitoring legal developments, unpacking the legal implications of policy decisions, and tracking evolving transitional justice mechanisms.

This specialized engagement enables SLDP, and other similarly situated NGOs, to translate complex legal and institutional processes into accessible knowledge that can be shared with victims and grassroots actors, thereby supporting their ability to exercise their agency and advocate for the outcomes they seek. In particular, the emerging dialogue between civil society, impacted communities, and bodies such as the NTJC represents a promising site for advancing victim-centered approaches to economic crimes. Particularly given the above discussed fact that the NTJC is directly asking Syrian citizens to provide their answers to complicated questions about justice for economic crimes and violations. When community members are empowered to answer such questions, informed on the latest developments, and knowledgeable about international legal standards and comparative contexts, Syria and Syrians benefit from fuller, more representative justice frameworks.

Syria’s transitional period can be viewed as a moment of country-wide negotiations. For those negotiations to result in the best possible outcome for affected communities and victims, victims need to be at the table, empowered to advocate for the realities, decisions, and processes they envision.

Written by: Sumaya Daghestani, Legal Intern at the Human Rights & Business Unit, J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School.

The undersigned organizations are closely monitoring, with deep concern, the humanitarian and security situation in northeastern Syria following the signing of the agreement reached between the Syrian Transitional Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces on 21st January. The agreement aims to establish a ceasefire and to take steps toward integration within the Syrian state. As the four-day period stipulated in the agreement approaches its end, and at a moment marked by fear, widespread displacement, and renewed violence, the transition from armed confrontation to pathways centered on the protection of civilians, the safeguarding of the rights and dignity of the Syrian people, dialogue, and political solutions is of critical importance and must be preserved and strengthened.

In recent days, there has been a dangerous escalation of violence in the city of Aleppo and in several areas of northern and eastern Syria, accompanied by large-scale displacement and a significant deterioration of humanitarian conditions. During this period, serious violations of international law have been reported by both parties to the conflict against the Syrian people, in many cases amounting to collective punishment for the purposes of political pressure. The undersigned organizations call for an independent and impartial investigation into all alleged violations committed by all parties to the conflict, within the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry (CoI), and for the prosecution of all individuals found to be responsible for these violations.

As a result of this escalation and increasing violence, widespread displacement has been reported in northeastern Syria, affecting more than 134,000 people over a short period of time, according to the United Nations. The displaced have arrived in the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, al-Malikiyah/Derik, and Kobani. Many displaced persons face severe shortages of shelter, food, and humanitarian assistance, amid harsh weather conditions that further exacerbate their vulnerability. Given the critical humanitarian situation and the military encirclement of several areas, including Kobani, the undersigned organizations demand that the Syrian Transitional Government ensure the adoption of all necessary measures to restore essential services (electricity, water, food, internet, and medicines) to residents of the affected areas, open safe humanitarian corridors, and facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations to mitigate the impact of displacement on the population.

This escalation has generated deep fears among residents, particularly in Kobani and al-Hasakah, regarding the entry of the Syrian Transitional Government; fears that cannot be separated from the cumulative impact of past violations and their enduring legacy on local communities, and the profound lack of trust they have produced. This reality underscores the central importance of trust-building and the serious consequences of its absence. Trust cannot be imposed or extracted by force; rather, it must be earned through concrete steps, including the protection of civilians, the regulation of the conduct of armed actors, ensuring accountability for violations, restoring rights (including property, land, and housing rights) and engaging in genuine and effective dialogue with all Syrians.

Accordingly, the undersigned organizations call on both the Syrian Transitional Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces to fulfill their legal obligations to protect civilians and prevent any harm to them, and to take effective and tangible measures to prevent any act or rhetoric that could incite violence, inflame societal tensions, or deepen divisions among Syrians, given the direct threat this poses to civil peace and the serious legal responsibilities it may entail. In light of incidents of communal violence that occurred in 2025, both the Syrian Transitional Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces bear heightened obligations to ensure effective protection for all at-risk communities and to take proactive and concrete measures to prevent any form of collective violence or harm against Syrians and to guarantee non-recurrence of violations.

In this context, the undersigned organizations affirm that any approach to Kurdish national rights, including those referenced in Presidential Decree No. 13, must begin first and foremost with serious and open dialogue with the Kurdish communities themselves, and must evolve in line with their collective visions and aspirations. We further stress that any recognition of rights is incomplete unless it is translated into legal guarantees and constitutional protections that are safeguarded from manipulation and provide effective protection on the ground, including the adoption of explicit measures to prevent any form of collective punishment against Kurdish communities or any other component.

We further emphasize the urgent need to confront hate speech and incitement and to ensure accountability for it. Incendiary rhetoric, dehumanizing narratives, and misinformation fuel fear, legitimize violence, and place civilians at risk. They also undermine efforts to rebuild trust between communities and perpetuate cycles of grievance and revenge. All parties, including media outlets, must act responsibly and refrain from using language that promotes hatred, justifies violations against any societal group, or spreads rumors. We also stress the necessity of ensuring unconditional access for documentation groups and international and independent media to guarantee transparent documentation and coverage.

The undersigned organizations also emphasize the need to approach security developments from the perspective of the rights of victims of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, and to uphold the duty to protect files, documents, detention facilities, and prisons. We further call on the Syrian Transitional Government to act transparently and to share information regarding the files of detained ISIS members accused of crimes, the files of the organization’s missing persons and victims, and the files of detainees and missing persons in the prisons of the Transitional Government, and the prisons of the Syrian Democratic Forces, including those recently detained.

We affirm that both the Syrian Transitional Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces bear joint responsibility for the Syria that is being built today. No one is beyond accountability, and no political or military objective can justify violations of human rights. All parties bear responsibility not only for ending the violence, but also for ensuring that new grievances are not created that could harm the future of the Syrian people. The interests, safety, and dignity of Syrians must take precedence over considerations of power, control, or influence. This agreement should represent a genuine turning point, replacing the use of force with restraint, violence with dialogue, and placing the rights and dignity of all Syrians at the foundation of the country’s future.

In conclusion, the undersigned organizations call for the opening of effective channels of communication with civil society organizations operating in areas affected by recent events, and for the launch of a serious discussion regarding the guarantees and reassurances provided to the population, especially in a context where such guarantees are often offered to military actors rather than to civilians. The organizations further stress the necessity of genuinely and effectively involving representatives of the population in any security or administrative arrangements that affect their lives and rights, and affirm their readiness to contribute to any effort aimed at reducing tensions and preventing bloodshed.

Signatories organisations:
1. The Syria Campaign
2. Women Now for Development
3. Prisons Museum
4. Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP)
5. Lelun Association for Victims
6. Synergy Association for Victims
7. Citizens for Syria
8. The Day After
9. Hevy for Relief and Development
10. Syrian Foundation for Research and Sustainable Development
11. For Feminist
12. Abktar
13. Muzn
14. Transformative Pathways
15. Equal Citizenship Center
16. DAR Association for Victims of Forced Displacement
17. Missing Person’s Families Platform in North East Syria
18. Dawlaty
19. Seen for Civil Peace
20. Insight Organisation
21. Civil Society Enablement Unit (CSEU)
22. White Hope Organization
23. Access Center for Human Rights (ACHR)
24. Syrian Center for Studies and Dialogue (SCSD)
25. Vejin Initiative
26. Dar Justice
27. Syrians for Truth and Justice
28. Justice for Life
29. Media for Women
30. Kesh Malek
31. Syrian Network in Denmark
32. Ashna for Development
33. Baytna
34. Jian Humanitarian Organisation
35. The Kurdish Legal Studies Center (YASA)
36. PÊL- Civil Waves
37. Impact
38. Ella Organisation for Development and Peacebuilding
39. Huquqyat
40. Malva Organisation for Arts, Culture and Education
41. ASO Centre for Consultancy and Strategic Studies
42. Bidayetna
43. Humanitarian and Development Cooperation (HDC)
44. Local Development and Small Projects Support (LDSPS)
45. Demos
46. Center for Civil Society and Democracy
47. Salam for Hope Foundation
48. Taafi Initiative
49. Kurdish Journalists Network
50. ADAD
51. Syrian Women’s Association
52. Caesar Files for Justice
53. Nujin Society for Community Development
54. RE for Rehabilitation and Development
55. Humanitarian Independent Message Organisation
56. ARAS
57. Human Rights Guardians
58. DAN for Relief and Development
59. Network of Statelessness Victims in al-Hasakah (NSVH)
60. Truth Guardians

Mohammad Saber Hamsho is a Syrian businessman who emerged as one of the most prominent economic actors associated with the Assad regime during fourteen years of the Syrian uprising. Born in Damascus in 1966, Hamsho built a diversified business empire spanning construction, petrochemicals, telecommunications, media production, and engineering. His economic rise was closely tied to networks of political influence and patronage, particularly through his relationship with Maher al-Assad, brother of former president Bashar al-Assad.

Because of these affiliations, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on Hamsho and his companies early in the uprising, designating him as one of the regime’s key economic enablers. He was accused of operating as a commercial front for regime interests and of profiting from violence, pillage, and so-called reconstruction opportunities linked to military campaigns against civilian areas.

In late 2025 and early 2026, Hamsho returned to the center of public debate in Syria following an announcement by the newly formed Syrian government’s Commission for Combating Illicit Gain that it had reached a comprehensive settlement with him. Under this arrangement, Hamsho submitted extensive disclosures of his assets and relinquished significant holdings in exchange for regularizing the legal and financial status of his wealth. The Commission explicitly stated that the settlement is limited to the recovery of public funds obtained through illicit gain during the previous period and does not extend to criminal or penal accountability, including war-related crimes or what is commonly referred to as war profiteering.

The agreement immediately triggered widespread criticism both inside Syria and internationally. Many questioned how an individual widely perceived as complicit in grave abuses could secure an administrative settlement without judicial scrutiny, warning that such arrangements risk emptying accountability of its substance and entrenching selective impunity.

There is no sound legal framework in Syria’s existing legislation that authorizes the state to “regularize” the status of individuals suspected of serious financial crimes, let alone those potentially involved in facilitating grave violations, without subjecting them to judicial accountability. The absence of a legal framework here does not merely reflect the lack of an explicit prohibition, but rather the absence of any legislative text that clearly defines the competent authority, scope, mechanisms, safeguards, limits, and judicial oversight governing such settlements, including protections for victims’ rights. The executive branch cannot undertake measures of this nature without an explicit legal basis, which cannot be supplied by administrative delegation or a presidential decree that neither supersedes the law nor replaces judicial authority.

Under the general principles of national law, consistent with international legal obligations, the state bears the responsibility to investigate alleged crimes and determine individual criminal liability through fair and independent judicial proceedings.

The proper legal process requires investigation, referral to the judiciary, and the issuance of a final judgment of acquittal or conviction. No definitive legal effects arise from this process unless and until a final judicial decision is rendered. Within this framework, alternative approaches, such as settlements or non-judicial mechanisms, can only be contemplated in an exceptionally narrow context, after judicial proceedings have been completed, and in a manner that fully safeguards victims’ rights to accountability, remedy, and reparation.

What occurred in Hamsho’s case circumvented this legal sequence. A financial and administrative settlement was concluded outside the judiciary through a committee that, under its founding decree, possesses no judicial authority and no mandate to determine criminal liability. Even where such settlements are formally presented as not granting immunity or closing criminal files, their conclusion prior to judicial proceedings effectively pre-empts the ordinary course of accountability. Nor can this step be legally justified by reference to a transitional justice law that has yet to be enacted. Even if later associated with such a framework, the retroactive use of legislation to legitimize prior arrangements departs from established legal principles governing accountability processes.

The conclusion is difficult to avoid. This agreement cannot be considered consistent with national legal frameworks. Rather, it raises serious concerns about the institutionalization of exceptional settlements that undermine the rule of law and entrench selective impunity.

At the international level, international law imposes a clear obligation on states to investigate and prosecute international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. This obligation applies not only to armed forces or non-state armed actors, but to all actors, including economic ones.

Rule 158 of the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, binding on all states, requires the investigation and prosecution of war crimes allegedly committed by a state’s nationals, placing Hamsho squarely within the scope of this obligation.

Recent years have seen a marked increase in corporate accountability cases involving alleged complicity in international crimes. In France, the cement giant Lafarge and several of its executives are currently on trial for financing terrorism and violating international sanctions, while investigations into the company’s complicity in crimes against humanity remain ongoing. In Sweden, former executives of Lundin Oil are on trial for complicity in war crimes committed in South Sudan. These cases reflect a growing international trend toward holding economic actors accountable for their involvement in crimes that shock the conscience of humanity.

This focus is not new. At the Nuremberg Trials, senior executives from industries such as steel, chemicals, and weapons manufacturing were prosecuted for complicity in Nazi atrocities.

Accordingly, any decision by the transitional Syrian government to absolve Hamsho of responsibility for aiding or abetting large-scale atrocities committed by the Assad regime would constitute a serious breach of its obligations under international law and a clear violation of victims’ rights.

Beyond questions of legality, the settlement with Hamsho also carries serious symbolic and communicative consequences that risk undermining confidence in transitional justice and accountability pathways.

In the days following the announcement, demonstrators across Syria protested the agreement. Syrians, including directly affected individuals, gathered in cities and neighborhoods severely impacted by Hamsho’s activities, such as Jobar, Daraya, and Qaboun. Victims emphasized that the state’s settlement with Hamsho does not extinguish their individual claims against him, which remain valid and must be respected.

Public frustration over the absence of redress and reparations reverberated in the streets and across social media. Others warned that “normalizing relations” with one of the regime’s principal financiers signals a continuation of the pre-December 2024 order, in which wealth and political connections enabled individuals to evade justice.

In response, the National Transitional Justice Commission clarified that administrative settlements do not replace judicial accountability within the transitional justice process. The statement further emphasized that financing serious crimes and human rights violations, conduct applicable to Hamsho’s case, constitutes an offense that cannot be subject to amnesty.

Impunity, and even the perception of impunity, undermines transitional justice, which depends on the trust and participation of affected rights-holders. If Syrian victims perceive that decisions concerning justice are made without their meaningful involvement, they may lose faith in transitional justice altogether and disengage from future processes, including truth-seeking mechanisms and prosecutions. Moreover, failing to dismantle the power and influence of former high-level perpetrators leaves the risk of recurrence insufficiently addressed.

For these reasons, if Syria’s transitional justice project is to retain credibility, the Hamsho settlement cannot be treated as a final resolution. At a minimum, authorities must clearly and collectively affirm the separation between asset recovery and criminal accountability, ensuring that financial settlements do not terminate or pre-empt judicial proceedings. Any recovered assets must be transparently linked to victim reparations, rather than treated as discretionary state revenue.

More fundamentally, credible investigations into Hamsho’s alleged role in financing and facilitating serious crimes must proceed through independent judicial channels, whether domestically or through international cooperation. Victims must be recognized as rights-holders, not as bystanders to elite bargains, and must be granted standing to pursue their claims.

Ultimately, the choice facing Syria is not between economic recovery and justice. Durable recovery depends on the rule of law. Exceptional deals with powerful figures may yield short-term financial gains, but they carry long-term costs: eroded legitimacy, weakened institutions, and a hollowed-out transitional justice process. If reconciliation is to be more than a slogan, it must be grounded in accountability.

Media advisory: 16 December 2025

* Groups call for an investigation into Bashar Al -Assad, Asmaa Al- Assad and key officials for the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance
* Argentina uniquely placed to investigate enforced disappearance, including the removal of children from their families and concealment of their identities

Families and survivors of the Truth and Justice Charter (TJC), the Association of Detainees and Missing of Sednaya Prison (ADMSP), and the Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP), with the legal support of Estudio Durrieu and their Foundation for International Victims, filed a criminal complaint within Argentina’s federal justice system on 5th December calling for the opening of an investigation into the responsibility of former President Bashar al-Assad, Asma’ al-Assad and key Syrian regime officials for crimes against humanity of enforced disappearance. Today, the groups explain what the case means for search for truth and justice.

The complaint focuses on crimes against humanity of enforced disappearance, with a particular emphasis on the systematic disappearance of children through arbitrary detention, removal from their families and the long-term concealment of their fate and whereabouts.

The case is brought under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which empowers Argentina’s federal courts to investigate and prosecute international crimes, regardless of where they were committed or the nationality of perpetrators or victims. Argentina has played a pioneering role in prosecuting crimes of enforced disappearance, including those involving the removal and identity suppression of children.

Fatima Al Wahidi from the Charter group, mother of Mohannad Omar, who has been forcibly disappeared since 2012, and received documents in November 2025 indicating that he had been executed in Sednaya Prison, said:

“Just as the mothers and grandmothers of Argentina led the path to justice; defying silence, fear, and denial, and changing history through their struggle, we, the Syrian mothers, follow their footsteps with unwavering faith.

“Just as we carried the photos of our sons and daughters in every square before the fall of the regime, we will continue our journey today, pursuing the criminals wherever they may be, until we achieve for our children the justice, freedom, and dignity they dreamed of.”

Sana Kikhia, Executive Director at the Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP) said:

“This case reflects the essence of transnational judicial solidarity: the understanding that when crimes against humanity are committed, every state has a duty to use all means at its disposal within their jurisdiction, including universal jurisdiction, to support justice efforts, and to ensure there is no safe haven for those responsible and no barrier to truth for survivors. Justice for Syrians is a collective responsibility, and Argentina, rooted in its own leadership in confronting enforced disappearance, can stand as a powerful act of solidarity with Syrian families and the ongoing Syrian-led pursuit of accountability.”

Malak Awdeh, mother of the child Maher Khankan, who was arrested from his school in 2012, said:

“My son’s disappearance from his school desk was not a mysterious fate, but an ongoing crime, a continuous form of cruel and inhuman punishment for both him and me.”

Reem Qari, mother of the child Karim Tarjoman, who was arrested with his father and his father’s friend at a military checkpoint in rural Homs in 2013, said:

“Since the disappearance of my son Karim when he was only two and a half years old, along with his father at an Assad-regime military checkpoint, I have seen his face in every child I pass, in the streets, the markets, in every place I go. Karim is growing and changing far away from me, while I have not found a single thread that could lead me back to him.”

The complaint is a part of a broader set of work by families and legal experts, to advance truth and justice for families of the disappeared and of missing children, inside and outside Syria.

Argentina’s own transitional justice process and the tireless work of the families’ associations in Argentina established groundbreaking jurisprudence and investigative mechanisms for pursuing truth and justice for individuals and children disappeared.

Wafa Mustafa, Advocacy Manager at The Syria Campaign, and daughter of Ali Mustafa, forcibly disappeared since 2013 said:

“Since the fall of Assad a year ago, thousands of families have been calling for truth and justice for their loved ones, including families whose children were abducted by the regime and their fate, identities and whereabouts remain unknown. The international community and the interim authorities in Syria must not spare any effort to answer these demands. Justice for the crime of enforced disappearance is essential to ensure that Syria’s future is not built on denial, silence, or impunity.”

ENDS

Notes to editors

1. The Truth and Justice Charter is a coalition of victim and family associations advocating for justice and accountability.
2. To organize interviews with families, survivors or legal experts please contact:

For speakers from SLDP, Veronica Bellintani (English/Arabic/Spanish): v.bellintani@sldp.ngo

For speakers from the Charter group:Joud al-Hammade (English/Arabic): joud.alhammadeh@tjcharter.org

For speakers from ADMSP: Hanan Halimah (English/Arabic): hanan.h@admsp.org

Estudio Durrieu/Foundation for International Victims (English/Spanish): tag@victimsinternational.org and rdf@durrieu-lex.com (legal counsels for the filing parties)

Or: media@thesyriacampaign.org

Reference: https://thesyriacampaign.org/survivors-lawyers-and-families-of-syrias-disappeared-file-historic-complaint-in-argentina-against-assad/

At the 14th UN Forum on Business and Human Rights in Geneva last month, the panel ’Strengthening Accountability for Environmental Harm: Pathways for Transformative Business Practices’ offered a striking reminder of how the deeply the global conversation on environmental protection has shifted. No longer framed as a technical or sectoral concern, environmental destruction is increasingly recognised as a human rights crisis, a driver of instability, and, most notably, a potential international crime.

The normative framework already places a responsibility on public and private actors to refrain from posing environmental harm. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights sets expectations for businesses to respect both human rights and the environment, including international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict—which provides a number of normative prescriptions in relation to the environment in international and non-international armed conflicts. In July 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recognising the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, underscoring the interdependent nature of human rights and environmental protection. While the Rome Statute offers limited environmental protection in non-international armed conflicts, environmental damage may still constitute material elements of other crimes—such as the war crime of pillage. Still, a gap remains: the law struggles to capture deliberate, systematic, and profit-driven environmental harm.

In Syria, the fragmentation of political and economic governance, the destruction of infrastructure, and the collapse of state oversight have produced some of the region’s most severe environmental crises. In the northeast, the dismantling of formal oil infrastructure and the delegation of extraction to contractors associated with armed non-state actors triggered the proliferation of primitive oil “burners”. These makeshift refineries, run by local businesses and informal networks, produced thick plumes of toxic smoke, radioactive by-products, and riverbank contamination. Communities continue to bear the health burdens: cancers, miscarriages, respiratory disease, poisoned water supplies, and degraded soil.

Furthermore, fuel scarcity and economic desperation fuelled a thriving black-market logging industry. Organised traders, charcoal producers, armed groups, and business actors linked to political elites profited from large-scale deforestation across various regions. Compounding this, many forest fires were deliberately set—sometimes by business elites tied to the Assad regime—seeking to clear land for construction, industrial use, or lucrative charcoal production. These fires have erased destroyed livelihoods and permanently altered fragile ecosystems.

Against the backdrop of stark environmental devastation globally, and the lack of political will to regulate unfettered corporate power and enforce accountability, the momentum around recognising ecocide as an international crime has grown rapidly.

The Independent Expert Panel for the Legal Definition of Ecocide proposed in 2021 that:

“Ecocide” means unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts.

Kate Mackinstosh, Deputy Co-Chair of the Expert Panel, noted that ecocide has been introduced in statutes in Belgium and Chile, while legislative proposals are advancing in Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Scotland, Spain and more. By May 2026, EU Member States will be required to criminalise conduct equivalent to ecocide under the new Environmental Crime Directive. At the international level, small-island developing states, namely Vanuatu, Fiji, and Samoa, as well as the Democratic Republic of Congo, have formally proposed amending the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to include ecocide as the fifth international crime, alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. It stands to reason that ecocide is a rapidly evolving legal project, and one that is gaining currency. The question remains: what difference will criminalizing ecocide make?

Mackintosh outlined the key ways in which recognizing ecocide could transform business behaviour and level the playing field:

1. A Higher Level of Deterrence
Civil and administrative penalties rarely deter large corporations. But the allegation of an international crime, combined with the legal, financial, and
reputational fallout for executives and investors fundamentally shifts the risk calculus. Under international criminal law, liability is personal: executives cannot outsource responsibility.

2. Stronger, Earlier, More Meaningful Due Diligence
Ecocide forces companies to rethink projects at inception, not after harm occurs. Businesses must ask:
Is this project fundamentally safe? Who bears the risk? Are vulnerable communities disproportionately exposed?

3. Removing the Burden from Victims
Civil litigation places the burden on victims to seek justice. Criminal law shifts accountability to the state and international community: environmental destruction becomes recognised not as a private dispute but as a crime that affects humanity as a whole.

Syria’s current environmental legislation remains poorly enforced and ill-suited to the scale of wartime destruction. The political transition offers a rare opportunity to modernise these laws to reflect the country’s current crises. As reconstruction-linked

investment flows begin to pour into the high-risk setting, a robust criminal code has never been more critical.

At the Human Rights and Business Unit, we have consistently highlighted the legal and financial risks businesses face when they fail to account for environmental and conflict-related harms. Our recent recommendations to companies exploring investment in Syria emphasise environmental due diligence as integral to conflict-sensitive, rights-respecting business conduct. In November 2025, shortly before the UN Forum, we hosted Syria’s first conference on business and human rights, dedicating a full panel to the environmental challenges of reconstruction. The transitional government will have the responsibility—and the opportunity—to build a robust regulatory framework that reins in foreign investors, protects communities, and prioritises sustainable recovery.

Criminalising ecocide would not solve Syria’s long standing environmental challenges, but it would set a powerful normative baseline: no actor, business or otherwise, may profit from the destruction of Syria’s environment without facing the highest level of accountability.

As Mackintosh put it:

“Ecocide is not a silver bullet, but it does shift incentives in a powerful way…When incentives change, behaviour changes.”

Written by: Alreem Kamal, Legal Officer at the Human Rights & Business Unit of SLDP

On the first anniversary of the fall of the Assad regime, we mark a defining moment in Syria’s modern history.

This day stands as a reminder of the profound suffering Syrians endured, and of the collective determination to rebuild a country grounded in justice, dignity, and the rule of law.

Over the past year, the Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP) has contributed to shaping the early foundations of this transition through principled work and close coordination with Syrian civil society, victims’ and survivors’ associations, national institutions, UN mechanisms, and states.

Throughout 2025, SLDP’s work contributed to several core advances in Syria’s justice and human rights landscape:
* Elevating the rights of communities most affected by violations: SLDP supported survivors of chemical attacks, families of the disappeared, displaced communities, and residents affected by housing, land, and property (HLP) rights violations, ensuring their perspectives guide transitional justice and accountability efforts

* Designing victim-centered initiatives involving affected community groups on HLP rights violations, and conducting high-level engagements in Syria. This model aimed to support transitional justice efforts and offer a blueprint for addressing HLP violations nationwide. SLDP also began mapping businesses involved in HLP rights violations for future engagement and accountability work and engagement with the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing.

* Strengthening victims’ participation and influence: SLDP supported associations of victims of human rights violations committed by all parties to engage with the National Commission on Missing Persons and the National Commission on Transitional Justice, advancing victims’ participation as a central principle guiding emerging transitional mechanisms.

* Enhancing state–civil society engagement: Through structured briefings at the Human Rights Council, and bilateral meetings, SLDP contributed to improving states’ understanding of the human rights situation in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and to align their positions with Syrians’ human rights, democratic transformation, and justice priorities.

* Advancing transnational judicial solidarity for the pursuit of justice against the Syrian regime: SLDP and victims and families groups will soon share updates on a new universal jurisdiction case in Argentina. More details to be shared.

* Ensuring the strategic role of UN Human Rights Bodies: Through sustained engagement with UN Human Rights Bodies, including Special Procedures and Treaty-Based Bodies, SLDP supported efforts to ensure UN Bodies will play a strategic role in Syria’s new phase to advance, amplify and support Syrian-led calls for reform, accountability, and human rights protection after the fall of Assad.

* Supporting national transitional justice architecture: By co-developing, convening, and facilitating the Transitional Justice Coordination Group — comprising around 50 Syrian organisations — SLDP helped develop shared principles on truth, remedy, and guarantees of non-recurrence now informing national institutions.

* Building the legal foundations of the transition: SLDP produced analyses on constitutional obligations, criminal justice pathways and reform, and electoral frameworks which are now used by national commissions, policymakers, and international partners in their work during Syria’s transitional phase.

* Embedding human rights safeguards in reconstruction and the economy: Through its Human Rights and Business Unit, SLDP advanced human rights due diligence standards vis-a-vis ministries, UN agencies, businesses, and donors, and convened Syria’s first conference on Business and Human Rights
— setting golden standards for rights-based economic recovery.

* Advancing sanctions-related advocacy by issuing a position paper endorsing the lifting of sectoral sanctions while maintaining individual sanctions against human rights abusers—an approach later adopted by multiple civil society groups. SLDP has been holding regular meetings with U7 and EU foreign ministries, sanctions desks, and multilateral partners to promote sanctions relief aligned with human rights protections and economic stabilization in the post-Assad context.

* Raising awareness of business’ human rights responsibilities across key areas—including reconstruction and HLP rights, responsible investment, and environmental protection—through targeted outreach sessions, publications, and social media engagement. SLDP has also advocated for business respect for human rights in Syria at major international forums, including the UNDP Global Programme Annual Meeting, the ICAR Annual Meeting, the Africa–Arab States Regional Dialogue on BHR, and events on Syrian asset recovery and the establishment of a Syrian Victims Fund.

* Advocating strongly for the integration of Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) in all our meetings with government officials and humanitarian actors, emphasizing that reconstruction and development efforts must be firmly grounded in a human rights centred approach. By promoting HRDD, we aimed to ensure that emerging policies and programmes uphold the rights, dignity, and protection of affected communities throughout every stage of recovery and development.

One year on, the transition remains fragile, and the foundations for a rights-based future must be strengthened.

SLDP remains committed to working with all partners — Syrian and international — to support truth, justice, institutional reform, and non-recurrence, and to contribute constructively to a Syria where dignity is protected and accountability is the norm.

Our commitment continues — for a just, transparent, and rights-centred future for all.

“ We may have a hundred reasons to be afraid, but we have a million reasons to be hopeful. Over the past year, Syria’s civil society has moved from watching the world rush to normalixe a criminal regime to standing firmly beside our people in Syria—engaging national bodies on justice, pressing for accountability for all victims of violations before and a er 8 December 2024, and driving the conversation forward. This is a moment of defiance and determination, held together by a growing hope.”

— Sana Kikkia, Executive Director, Syrian Legal Development Programme